Carver v. Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks and Flathead County Cause No. DV-10-667(B), 11th Judicial District, Flathead County

Plaintiff Dennis Carver owns property on Church Slough, a water body connected to the Flathead River. Mr. Carver petitioned the county to relocate a county road so his subdivision could be marketed as waterfront property. The county agreed on the condition that Carver provide for public access to the slough. Carver deeded a lot to the county and the county subsequently developed a county park/public water access with a concrete boat ramp. Carver alleges that the county agreed to water access that would only allow hand launching of small boats. Carver brings various causes of action against the county including negligent misrepresentation and regulatory taking. He brings two counts against FWP: 1) that FWP violated MEPA by issuing the county a Streambed Protection Act Permit (to develop the boat ramp) with an insufficient EA, 2) that FWP violated the Streambed Protection Act itself and section 23-1-110, MCA, which requires FWP to perform additional analysis when developing a state park or fishing access site.

1 Ken A. Kalvig Angela M. LeDuc 2 Kalvig & LeDuc, P.C. 1830 3rd Avenue East, Suite 301 3 P. O. Box 1678 Kalispell, MT 59903-0728 Telephone: (406) 257-6001 4 Facsimile: (406) 257-6082 5 Attorneys for Petitioners 6 MONTANA ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FLATHEAD COUNTY 7 Dennis Carver, Lower Valley Properties, Inc., 8 Plaintiffs, Cause No. DV-10-667(B) 9 Judge: Katherine B. Curtis Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & 10 Parks, a division of the State of Montana, SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND Flathead County, a political subdivision of the PETITION FOR REVIEW 11 State of Montana Defendants. 12 13. Plaintiffs/Petitioners, Dennis Carver and Lower Valley Properties, Inc. (collectively 14 referred to as "Plaintiffs") hereby amend their complaint and petition for review pursuant to 15 M.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and complain, allege and aver as follows: 16 Plaintiff Dennis Carver ("Carver") is a resident of Flathead County, Montana and 1. 17 owns and resides on Lot 9 of the River Vista Subdivision located in the 18 NE1/4,Sec.36,T.28N,R.21W of Flathead County, Montana ("River Vista Subdivision"). A copy 19 of the final plat of the River Vista Subdivision is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 20 2. Plaintiff Lower Valley Properties, Inc. ("Lower Valley Properties") is a 21 Corporation formed and existing under the laws of the State of Montana, and is the owner of 22 Lots 1-8, 10 and 11 of the River Vista Subdivision. 23

Kalvig & LeDuc, P.C. Kalispell, Montana Attornevs at Law

24

. 1

**EXHIBIT** 

1	3. Carver and/or Lower Valley Properties' predecessors, Carver Investments,
2	L.L.C., Goose Pit Gravel Company, L.L.C., and Mackinaw Estates, L.L.C., have assigned any
3	and all rights, claims, and causes of action arising under the relevant facts hereto to Lower
4	Valley Properties and Carver.
5	4. Defendant, Flathead County, is and was at all times relevant hereto a body politic
6	and corporate formed and acting under the laws of the State of Montana with a principal place of
7	business located at 800 South Main, Kalispell, Montana.
8	5. Defendant, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks ("FWP") is and was
9	at all times relevant hereto an agency of the State of Montana and public body corporate and
10	politic organized in accordance with MCA Title 2, Chapter 15.
11	6. Venue is proper in this court.
12	7. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this complaint.
13	8. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for review pursuant to
14	§2-4-702, MCA, et. seq.
15	9. At all times relevant, the FWP was the reviewing agency within the context of
16	§87-5-501, MCA and §23-1-110, MCA, that was responsible for making a decision relative to
17	Flathead County's 124 Permit Application, and was duly authorized and empowered by the
18	State of Montana to perform all duties and assume all responsibilities thereunder.
19	10. The Plaintiffs assert claims against Flathead County in its capacity as a county
20	insofar as liability is imputed to it under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the actions of its employees
21	operating within its various departments, including the Flathead County Parks and Recreation
22	Department ("Parks Department") and the Flathead County Planning and Zoning Department
23	("Planning Department"), insofar as their unconstitutional acts and omissions implemented and

Attorneys at Law

1	executed decisions officially adopted and promulgated by Flathead County's agents and
2	employees.
3	11. The establishment of Counties and their Planning and Zoning Departments
4	("Planning Department"), and Parks and Recreation Departments ("Parks Department")
5	operating in those Counties within the State of Montana originates and is premised upon
6	Montana statutory law.
7	12. The powers and duties of Counties and their Planning Departments and Parks
8	Departments operating within those Counties of the State of Montana originate in and are
9	premised upon Montana statutory law.
10	13. On or around October 11, 2006, Carver Investments, L.L.C. submitted a
11	preliminary plat application for the River Vista subdivision to the Flathead County Planning and
12	Zoning Department. At that time, Carver Investments, L.L.C., an entity in which Carver is and
13	was the sole member, was the record owner of that real property.
14	14. In and around the above-described time frame, Carver and Carver Investments
15	were working with Flathead County to accomplish an abandonment and relocation of Wagner
16	Lane. Wagner Lane was a county road near the edge of Carver Investments' property. The
17	property, but not Wagner Lane, abutted Church Slough. For many years, members of the public
18	would cross the private property located between Wagner Lane and Church Slough to access the
19	water.
20	15. This "unofficial" access from Wagner Lane across private property consisted of a
21	relatively steep embankment where users could access Church Slough only by foot. The top of
22	the embankment was covered by trees, vegetation and shrubs, while the lower portion consisted

largely of rocks and gravel. Since the access was primitive in nature, the extent of the public's

23

1	use was limited to hand-carrying small watercraft and icehouses down this embankment to the
2	water.
3	16. The proposed relocation of Wagner Lane generated some controversy regarding
4	the "unofficial" public access to Church Slough that occurred from the road.
5	17. Carver Investments proposed to create eleven large-sized lots, some of which
6	border Church Slough, and initially proposed to provide cash-in-lieu of parkland. Carver
7	Investments later agreed, instead of cash-in-lieu of parkland, to provide both a public park and
8	legal fishing access to Church Slough ("River Vista park") where none had previously existed.
9	18. Specifically, the Environmental Assessment ("River Vista EA"), excerpts of
10	which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B," stated:
11	The applicant proposes developing a 1.037 acre park and public access to Church Slough. The proposed park would provide five parking spaces for the
12	public and a walking path down to the slough where one could launch a canoe or pull an ice fishing house out in the winter
13	See, Exhibit B, p. 16.
14	
15	19. On December 26, 2006, the Planning Department issued its staff report. Finding of fact no. 18 states the proposed River Vista park "would provide five public parking spaces
16	
17	and a walking path down to the slough where one could launch a canoe or pull an ice fishing
18	house out in the winter." A copy of the Planning Department's staff report is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." See, Ex. C, p. 14.
19	
20	ancluded solutions of approval included
21	several addressing the proposed River Vista park, the language of which was adopted by the
22	Commissioners and is set forth in Paragraph 23 of this Complaint, below. None of the
23	recommended conditions of approval indicated the park and water access would be greater than
24	

1	of different from that proposed by Carver Investments.
2	21. During the subdivision process, Carver repeatedly communicated both his vision
3	for River Vista park as a park and limited fishing access site and what he was willing to allow
4	on River Vista park if he were to convey it to Flathead County. These communications were
5	made to members of the public, representatives from special interest groups such as Flathead
6	Wildlife, and to employees and agents of Flathead County.
7	22. In fact, on January 26, 2007, Carver sent the Flathead County Commissioners a
8	letter that outlined the details of his park proposal in exchange for the abandonment/relocation
9	of Wagner Lane. In that letter, Dennis states that "no ramp is to be built" as part of his
10	parkland grant. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "D."
11	23. On March 20, 2007, the Commissioners voted 2-1 to approve the River Vista
12	preliminary plat application, and included the following conditions of approval:
13 14	13. The parkland and the 100-ft. setback/buffer along Church Slough are critical bank stabilization areas. Any alteration to the areas may need to go through Flathead County Floodplain
15	Permit Process and the 310 Permit Process.
16	14. The subdivider shall convey a public park, with a public access road and a fire tanker recharge access to Church Slough
17	to Flathead County Parks No vegetation shall be removed from the area
18	A copy of the Commissioners approval letter with conditions and findings of fact is attached
19	hereto as Exhibit "E." See, Ex. E, p. 3.
20	24. On March 20, 2007, the Commissioners adopted the following findings of fact:
21 22 23	18. The [EA] states that the applicant proposes to develop a 1.037 acre park with public access to Church Slough. The proposed park would provide five (5) parking spaces for the public and a walking path down to the slough where one could launch a canoe or pull an ice fishing house out in the winter. The applicant has
- 1	apptuit nus

been in communications with Jed Fisher, of the Flathead County Parks Department, who expressed an interest in accepting this land as a county park to provide maintained access for the public

- Public access to Church Slough is an important issue that should be finalized prior to final plat applications. It shall be noted on the face of the final plat that this park will provide public access
- The Planning Department's staff report, and the Commissioners preliminary plat approval did not express or indicate that the park and water access would be of a scope or scale different from that proposed by Carver Investments and contained no references to the construction of a boat ramp in the River Vista park, the construction of which would have been in direct contravention of what Plaintiffs agreed to provide with respect to that land.
- Throughout the River Vista Subdivision process described above, various representatives of Flathead County, including Jed Fisher ("Fisher"), indicated that the County would not construct an unrestricted boat ramp on the land donated by Plaintiffs and would keep the scope and scale of the park limited to what was proposed by Carver Investments.
- On April 19, 2007, Carver Investments and Goose Pit Gravel, L.L.C. deeded 1.776 acres of land to Flathead County as per its agreement to provide Flathead County with a park as part of the River Vista subdivision approval. A copy of this deed is attached as Exhibit
  - The Commissioners approved the final plat on October 2, 2007.
- On various occasions after the land was deeded to Flathead County, Fisher, again, represented to Carver that the County would honor its promise made to Carver to refrain from putting in a boat ramp that would allow unrestricted access to Church Slough and that it

1	would keep the scope and scale of the park limited to what Carver Investments proposed and
2	Flathead County ratified during the River Vista subdivision approval process.
3	30. On February 28, 2009, Carver sent Fisher an email indicating he learned Flathead
4	County was planning to construct a boat ramp in the River Vista park. He reiterated that he
5	expressed concerns about this before and did not want more than minimal improvements. He
6	also stated that he deeded Flathead County the River Vista park because he believed that entity
7	would respect his intent and the understanding he reached with the entity. A copy of this e-mail
8	is attached as Exhibit "G."
9	31. On May 4, 2009, the Parks Department held a "public hearing" regarding the
10	boat ramp, where Carver attended and expressed his concerns.
11	32. On October 1, 2009, the Parks Department submitted its 124 Permit Application
12	to FCPD ("124 Permit Application"), which also serves as the County's Floodplain
13	Development Permit Application ("Floodplain Application") (collectively referred to as
14	"Application"). The Application specifies the purpose is for a concrete boat ramp and turn-
15	around area, and describes that vegetation will be removed, which, on its face, contradicts the
16	conditions of approval set forth in the Commissioner's grant of preliminary plat. See, Ex. E., p.
17	3.
18	33. The Application also includes other omissions and inadequate answers. A copy
19	of this 124 Permit Application/Floodplain Application, with its attachments is attached as
20	Exhibit "H."
21	34. The boat ramp, as designed, would enable large watercraft of all sizes to access
22	Church Slough, and there are no limits on watercraft size or horsepower included as part of the
23	124 Permit Application.

1	35. In February 2010, FWP, the state agency responsible for issuing 124 permits,
2	prepared an Environmental Assessment ("124 Permit EA") that acknowledges the boat ramp
3	will increase boat use, shoreline erosion, noise, and could impact critical habitat or wildlife use.
4	A copy of this EA is attached hereto as Exhibit "I." See, Ex. I, pp. 4, 8-12,14,
5	36. Despite these acknowledgements, the 124 Permit EA fails to discuss or
6	adequately address or evaluate the impacts that the increased and expanded access will have on
7	wildlife habitat and the natural and human environment, fails to discuss or adequately address or
8	evaluate reasonable alternatives or ways to mitigate impacts on wildlife habitat and the natural
9	and human environment, and fails to discuss or adequately address other required information,
10	and speculates that the boat ramp will not have "significant impacts" on the human or physical
11	environment. See, Ex. I, p. 15.
12	37. The 124 Permit Hearing occurred on March 18, 2010. Carver attended and
13	voiced his opposition to a grant of the same.
14	38. FWP granted the 124 Permit on April 6, 2010.
15	39. On April 9, 2010, the Planning Department granted the Parks Department a
16	Floodplain Development Permit based on its October 1, 2009 application. A copy of this Permit
17	grant is attached as Exhibit "J."
18	40. Carver and Lower Valley Properties own the land adjacent to and nearby the
19	River Vista park.
20	41. In and around the end of April and early May of 2010, Flathead County began
21	work related to the boat ramp on the River Vista park. As part of this work, the overwhelming
22	majority of the vegetation that covered the parkland has been torn out, which is in contravention
23	of the Flathead County Commissioners' conditions of subdivision approval for the park. See,

1	Ex. E., p. 3.
2	42.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

42. The Parks Department refuses to implement any kind of permanent restrictions or limitations on watercraft that can access Church Slough using the boat ramp at issue, including the watercraft's size or horsepower, which will result in the park and water access being substantially different than that agreed to by Carver Investments and approved by the County Commissioners during the River Vista Subdivision process.

- 43. The Parks Department refuses to develop and manage the River Vista park in accordance with its intended use and scope as set forth by Plaintiffs and ratified by Flathead County as part of the River Vista Subdivision process.
- 44. The installation of the boat ramp and associated improvements has and will continue to devalue Plaintiffs' properties.

# COUNT I – PETITION FOR REVIEW OF FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS' 124 PERMIT PURSUANT TO MONTANA'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (§2-4-702, MCA)

- 45. The allegations set forth in the preceding Paragraphs are realleged and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
- 46. Plaintiffs are aggrieved and have standing to appeal FWP's issuance of the 124 Permit under Montana's Administrative Procedure Act ("MAPA") and the Montana Environmental Protection Act ("MEPA"). No other administrative remedies are available to the Plaintiffs.
- 47. Pursuant to §2-4-702, MCA, et. seq., this court may conduct a judicial review of an agency decision when the decision is contested, the appellant has been aggrieved by the final decision, and where there are no other administrative remedies available within the agency.
  - 48. Section 2-4-704(2), MCA enables a court to reverse an agency decision if

substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because:

- (a) the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (i) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (ii) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (iii) made upon unlawful procedure; (iv) affected by other error of law; (v) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; (vi) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (b) findings of fact, upon issues essential to the decision, were not made although requested.
- 49. MEPA does not have a contested hearing provision, but both MAPA (§2-4-702(2)(d) and MEPA require an aggrieved party to file a petition for review with the District Court on a final agency decision involving MEPA, and MEPA claims must be heard by this Court at a hearing in accordance with the provisions of §75-1-201(3), et. seq. MCA.
- 50. The Flathead County's Parks Department unlawfully pursued a 124 Permit in contravention of its representations to Carver that it would refrain from constructing a ramp that would enable unlimited access to Church Slough and the subdivision approval conditions that prohibited the removal of vegetation in the River Vista park.
- 51. As part of the 124 Permit process, FWP's 124 Permit EA cited to, relied on, and needed to address the provisions of the Montana Environmental Protection Act (§75-1-201, MCA, et. seq.) ("MEPA"), and accordingly, needed to address and abide by the Administrative Regulations associated with MEPA, including but not limited to ARM 12.2.430 through 432.
- 52. FWP violated MEPA and associated ARMs by disregarding or failing to adequately address or evaluate specific criteria in its 124 Permit EA that must be evaluated as required by these aforementioned laws and regulations.
- 53. FWP failed to adequately address and evaluate the criteria it set forth in its own checklist contained in the EA.

1	54. FWP's grant of a 124 Permit using a legally deficient and inadequate 124 Permit
2	EA was arbitrary and capricious, and/or constituted an abuse or unwarranted exercise of its
3	discretion, and affected by error of law.
4	55. FWP's grant of a 124 Permit based on an application submitted by the County
5	that violated the law was clearly affected by error of law, was arbitrary and capricious, and/or
6	constituted an abuse or unwarranted exercise of its discretion.
7	56. Carver, individually and on behalf of Lower Valley Properties contested the boat
8	ramp as proposed via his attendance at public hearings and through written and verbal comment
9	presented to Flathead County and FWP.
10	57. By granting the 124 Permit based on a legally deficient 124 Permit EA and an
11	application submitted in contravention of Flathead County's representations made to Plaintiffs
12	and the limitations set forth in the preliminary plat approval, FWP's actions violated the
13	substantial rights of Plaintiffs.
14	58. Plaintiffs have and will incur actual and substantial damages as a direct and
15	proximate cause of FWP's 124 Permit grant to the Parks Department.
16	COUNT II -VIOLATIONS OF §23-1-110, MCA (IMPROVEMENT OR
17	DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PARKS AND FISHING ACCESS SITES) AND THE MONTANA STREAMBED PROTECTION ACT
18	59. The allegations set forth in the preceding Paragraphs are realleged and
19	incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
20	60. As part of the 124 Permit process, FWP's 124 Permit EA cited to, relied on, and
21	needed to address specific criteria set forth in §23-1-110, MCA and, accordingly, needed to
22	address and abide by the Montana Administrative Regulations ("ARM") associated with §23-1-
23	110, MCA, including but not limited to ARM 812 8 604

1	61. FWP violated §23-1-110, MCA and associated ARMs by disregarding or failing
2	to adequately address or evaluate specific criteria in its 124 Permit EA that must be evaluated as
3	required by these aforementioned laws and regulations.
4	62. FWP's issuance of the 124 Permit violated the provisions of the Montana Stream
5	Protection Act (§87-5-501, et. seq., MCA).
6	63. Plaintiffs have and will incur actual and substantial damages as a direct and
7	proximate cause of FWP's 124 Permit grant to the Parks Department in contravention of the
8	laws of the State of Montana.
9	COUNT III - FLATHEAD COUNTY'S ISSUANCE OF FLOODPLAIN PERMIT
10	#FDP-09-26 VIOLATES FLOODPLAIN AND FLOODWAY MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS
11	64. The allegations set forth in the Paragraphs are realleged and incorporated as
12	though fully set forth herein.
13	65. Plaintiffs are aggrieved and have standing to appeal Flathead County's issuance
14	of the Floodplain Development Permit.
15	66. Flathead County's Parks Department unlawfully pursued a Floodplain
16	Development Permit in contravention of its representations made to Plaintiffs that it would
17	refrain from constructing a ramp that would enable unlimited access to Church Slough.
18	67. The information required by Flathead County in its Floodplain Application
19	forms, is authorized by and in accordance with the Flathead County Floodplain and Floodway
20	Management Regulations via authority through Title 76, Chapter 5, MCA.
21	68. The Parks Department's Floodplain Application is incomplete and inadequate in
22	that it, among other things: 1) fails to answer all of the Application's questions; 2) fails to
23	provide adequate answers to some of the Application's questions; and, 3) fails to provide

1	information mandated by the Floodplain Application, including a map that contains all of the
2	information required in Section 2. See, Exhibit J.
3	69. Flathead County's grant of a Floodplain Development Permit to the Flathead
4	County Parks Department using a legally deficient and inadequate Floodplain Development
5	Application violated its Floodplain and Floodway Management Regulations, and was arbitrary
6	and capricious, and was otherwise in contravention of the laws of the State of Montana and the
7	Flathead County Floodplain and Floodway Management Regulations.
8	70. Carver, individually and on behalf of Lower Valley Properties contested the boat
9	ramp proposed that is the subject of the Floodplain Development Permit.
10	71. By granting the Floodplain Development Permit based on a legally deficient
11	Floodplain Application and in contravention to the Parks Department's representations to
12	Plaintiffs, Flathead County's actions have violated the law and the substantial rights of
13	Plaintiffs.
14	72. Plaintiffs have and will incur actual and substantial damages as a direct and
15	proximate cause of Flathead County's Floodplain Development Permit grant to the Parks
16	Department.
17	WHEREFORE, based on Counts I through III, above, Plaintiffs demand judgment as
18	follows:
19	a. For an order reversing or voiding FWP's issuance of a 124 Permit to the
20	Flathead County Parks Department for the River Vista park boat ramp and
21	turnaround area as proposed;
22	b. For an order reversing or voiding Flathead County's issuance of a Floodplain
23	Development Permit #FDP-09-26 for the River Vista park boat ramp and
24	

1	turnaround area;
2	c. Damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
3	d. Costs and attorney's fees to the extent allowed by law or equity; and,
4	e. For such other and further relief as this Honorable Court deems meet and just.
5	COUNT IV – 42 U.S.C. §1983 REGULATORY TAKING (FLATHEAD COUNTY)
6	73. The allegations set forth in the preceding Paragraphs are realleged and
7	incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
8	74. Plaintiffs assert claims of violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
9	Amendment of the United States Constitution as secured by 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Article II,
10	Section 29 of the Montana Constitution against Flathead County for the actions of its Parks
11	Department. Flathead County's decision to move forward with the installation of a boat ramp
12	and other improvements was done arbitrarily and in violation of its representations to Plaintiffs,
13	and its actions have denied Plaintiffs, in all practical effects, beneficial and economic use of
14	their property.
15	75. As a direct result of Flathead County's actions, the value of Plaintiffs' properties
16	have been vitiated.
17	76. Plaintiffs have incurred and will in the future continue to incur a substantial loss
18	of revenue and other financial harm arising out of Flathead County's illegal, wrongful, and
19	unconstitutional actions and omissions, including the loss of proceeds from the sale of
20	residential property, carrying costs, and other financial burdens and costs which Plaintiffs could
21	not reasonably have expected given the circumstances upon which the parkland was deeded and
22	the representations of Flathead County that, if it were to own the park, it would do so in
23	accordance with the limited use Plaintiffs set forth during the River Vista Subdivision approval

1	process and would not install an unrestricted boat ramp.
2	WHEREFORE, based on Count IV, above, Plaintiffs demand judgment against the
3	Defendant Flathead County for:
4	a. Compensatory Damages;
5	b. Costs;
6	c. Interest;
7	d. Expenses;
8	e. Attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; and,
9	f. For such other and further relief as this Court deems meet and just.
10	COUNT V – NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (FLATHEAD COUNTY)
11	77. The allegations set forth in the preceding Paragraphs are realleged and
12	incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
13	78. By affirming Plaintiffs' intent for the River Vista park in its public documents,
14	and by assuring Plaintiffs that it would not install a unrestricted access boat ramp on the land
15	Plaintiffs were considering donating to Flathead County, Flathead County made material factual
16	representations.
17	79. Flathead County's action taken to construct the boat ramp as designed and
18	proposed and to install the additional improvements establish that its representations were
19	untrue and made without any reasonable grounds for believing them to be true.
20	80. Flathead County's representations were made with the intent to induce Plaintiffs
21	to rely on it, because, had Flathead County indicated that it was, in fact, planning to construct
22	the boat ramp at issue, more than 5 parking spaces, a permanent bathroom and multitudes of
23	picnic tables, Plaintiffs would not have been willing to provide it with an unrestricted deed

1	81.	Plaintiffs were not aware of the falsity of Flathead County's representations and	
2	were justified in relying upon Flathead County's representations.		
3	82.	Plaintiffs have and will sustain damages resulting from their reliance on Flathead	
4	County's representations.		
5	COUNT VI – EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (FLATHEAD COUNTY)		
6	83.	The allegations set forth in the Paragraphs are realleged and incorporated as	
7	though fully set forth herein.		
8	84.	Flathead County's representations about the nature of the River Vista park and	
9	the access contained therein were made in order to induce Plaintiffs to deed the property to it,		
10	and the County's subsequent action to construct the boat ramp and other improvements shows		
11	that its conduct amounted to a representation or concealment of material facts.		
12	85.	Flathead County knew that it would not or may not honor Plaintiffs' wishes and	
13	abide by its representations relating to the boat ramp and associated improvements, or the		
14	circumstances were such that knowledge of the same should necessarily be imputed to Flathead		
15	County.		
16	86.	The truth concerning Flathead County's intent and plans for improvements on the	
17	River Vista public access were unknown to Plaintiffs.		
18	87.	Flathead County conducted itself in a manner that shows it intended and expected	
19	Plaintiffs to rel	y on its actions and representation, and Plaintiffs, in fact, relied upon Flathead	
20	County's representations regarding how it would improve and manage the River Vista park.		
21	88.	Flathead County's actions led Plaintiffs to agree to provide Flathead County with	
22	an unrestricted deed to the River Vista park.		
23	89.	Flathead County's installation of an unrestricted boat ramp access to Church	

1	Slough on the River Vista park has devalued Plaintiffs' properties, and the further installation of		
2	the planned improvements will continue to devalue the Plaintiffs' properties, all of which have		
3	caused or will cause Plaintiffs other damages, the nature and extent of which have not yet been		
4	assessed, and which will be determined at trial.		
5	COUNT VII- PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL (FLATHEAD COUNTY)		
6	90. The allegations set forth in the preceding Paragraphs are realleged and		
7	incorporated as though fully set forth herein.		
8	91. Flathead County's acceptance of the River Vista park based on Plaintiffs'		
9	stipulations that the County maintain it as a limited fishing access site and refrain from installing		
10	a large boat ramp and more than five parking spaces and other improvements constitutes a clear		
11	and unambiguous promise.		
12	92. Plaintiffs reasonably and foreseeably relied on Flathead County's promise, and,		
13	as a result of Flathead County's actions, Plaintiffs have been and will continue to be injured by		
14	the reliance.		
15	WHEREFORE, with respect to Counts V through VII set forth above, Plaintiffs pray		
16	for relief as follows:		
17	a. Damages in an amount to be determined at trial;		
18	b. Costs;		
19	c. Interest;		
20	d. Expenses;		
21	e. Attorneys' fees to the extent allowed by law or equity;		
22	f. Emotional distress damages; and		
23	g. For such other and further relief as this Court deems meet and just.		

# COUNT VIII- §27-19-101, et. seq., MCA PERMANENT INJUNCTION (FLATHEAD COUNTY)

- 93. The allegations contained in the preceding Paragraphs above are realleged and incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
- 94. Flathead County's actions, specifically, the construction of the boat ramp, and the current or impending construction and installation of eight parking spaces, permanent bathroom facility and unlimited picnic tables, all have or will continue to result in substantial and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs.
- 95. Quantification of pecuniary damages caused by Defendant Flathead County's actions would not afford adequate relief or may be difficult or impossible to fully demonstrate and prove, and may result in a multiplicity of judicial proceedings unless Defendant Flathead County is specifically enjoined from its actions and activity.

WHEREFORE, with respect to Count VIII set forth above, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:

- a. That Defendant Flathead County be permanently enjoined from constructing or installing improvements on the River Vista park that exceed the type and scope of use for the land set forth by Plaintiffs and adopted and ratified by Flathead County during the River Vista Subdivision approval process;
- b. That Defendant Flathead County be permanently enjoined from allowing or permitting any public use or activity that exceeds the type or scope of use for the land set forth by Plaintiffs and adopted and ratified by Flathead County during the River Vista Subdivision approval process;
- c. That any improvements already in place that exceed the type and scope of use

1	for the land set forth by Plaintiffs and adopted and ratified by Flathead County		
2	during the River Vista Subdivision approval process be removed;		
3	d. Attorneys' fees and costs to the extent allowed by law or equity; and,		
4	e. For such other and further relief as this Court deems meet and just.		
5	DATED this 11 <sup>th</sup> day of January, 2011		
6	KALVIG & LeDUG, P.O.		
7	Algerta V		
8	Angela M. LeDuc  Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
9			
10			
11			
12			
13	Exhibits:		
14	A. Final plat map of the River Vista Subdivision:		
15	C. Planning Department's Staff Report;		
16	<ul> <li>D. January 26, 2007 letter from Carver to the County Commissioners;</li> <li>E. Commissioners' River Vista approval letter w/conditions &amp; findings of fact;</li> <li>F. River Vista park deed to Flathead County;</li> </ul>		
17	G. February 28, 2009 e-mail from Carver to Fisher:		
18	I. FWP 124 Permit Environmental Assessment: and		
19	J. Flathead County's Floodplain Development Permit Grant.		
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE					
2	I, Angela M. LeDuc, one of the attorneys of the law firm of KALVIG & LEDUC,					
3	of the foregoing document upon the person(s) named below, at the address set out below.					
4	either by mailing, hand delivery, or Federal Express, in a properly addressed envelope, postage prepaid, or by telecopying a true and correct copy of said document.					
5 6	Gregory L. Bonilla MACo Legal Services 2717-F Skyway Drive Helena, MT 59602-1213	<ul> <li>[X] U.S. Mail (first class postage)</li> <li>[] Federal Express</li> <li>[] Hand-Delivery</li> <li>[] Telefacsimile</li> </ul>				
7 8	William A. Schenk, Agency Counsel and	[ ] Other: [X] U.S. Mail (first class postage)				
9	Special Assistant Attorney General State of Montana, Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks	[ ] Federal Express [ ] Hand-Delivery [ ] Telefacsimile				
10	1420 E. Sixth Ave. PO Box 200701 Helena, MT 59620-0701	[ ] Other:				
11 12	Peter A. Steele, Deputy County Attorney Flathead County Attorney's Office P.O. Box 1516	[X] U.S. Mail (first class postage) [ ] Federal Express				
13	Kalispell, MT 59903-1516	[ ] Hand-Delivery [ ] Telefacsimile [ ] Other:\				
14 15		W. Pala				
16		Angela M. LeDuc				
17		H:\C\Carver, Dennis\Church Slough 124\Pleadings\Second Amended Complaint.doc				
18						
19						
20						
21						
22		·				

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR REVIEW PAGE 20

23

# ORDER AND RATIONALE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 124 PERMIT

CLEER OF DISTRICT COURT

2013 JAN -7 AM 10:41

FILED

DEPUTY

KATHERINE R. CURTIS District Judge, Department No. 2 Flathead County Justice Center 920 South Main Street Kalispell, Montana 59901 (406) 758-5906

6

5

1

3

4

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24 25

26

27

28

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FLATHEAD

DENNIS CARVER and LOWER VALLEY PROPERTIES,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS, a division of the State of Montana, FLATHEAD COUNTY, a political Subdivision of the State of Montana,

Defendants.

Cause No. DV-10-667(B)

ORDER AND RATIONALE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 124 PERMIT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review of the determination by Defendant Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to issue a permit to the Flathead County Parks Department to construct a concrete boat ramp; and the Court having fully considered the petition, and supporting and opposition memoranda, affidavits and reports, and the parties having waived a hearing; and the Court thus being fully advised; Now therefore:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review contesting the 124 permit under the Stream Protection Act issued by Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks be and the same hereby is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that this matter is hereby REMANDED to the department for further

consideration of the application in light of the evidence and rationale set forth below.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' petition for judicial review seeking to void the 124 permit be and the same hereby is DENIED pending further consideration of the application by the department.

#### RATIONALE

This lawsuit arises from a dispute over development of a fishing access site located on property now owned by Flathead Plaintiff Dennis Carver, in the course of planning a housing development at Church Slough, arranged with Flathead County to carve out from the development and deed to the County a parcel of land to be used as a fishing access site. This was in exchange for the County abandoning a county road (Wagner Lane) which otherwise would run through the development. deeded access was meant to replace a former site that was not formally maintained as such, and was fairly primitive in nature. The former site had been accessed by parking on Wagner Lane and walking across private property; once Wagner Lane was closed to the public and the land adjoining the primitive site absorbed by Carver's project, public access was problematic. After Carver deeded the property to the County, the County Parks Department applied to the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks (hereafter FWP) for a permit to create a larger, designatedaccess site, with a concrete boat ramp, 5-8 parking spots, and The department granted the permit, known as a 124 turn-around. permit, which resulted in construction of the concrete ramp, thereby allowing the launching of larger motor boats, ski-doos, etc. Carver contends that the permit was granted without adequate consideration of the application and failure on the part of the department to follow its own rules. As a result, Carver contends the permit should be voided. In contrast, the department asks the Court, if it is inclined to void the permit, to instead identify evidence which it may not have considered and remand the issue to the department.

### I. Standard of Review

Plaintiff's second amended complaint contains two claims against Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks. Count I at issue herein is for judicial review of the agency's decision pursuant to §2-4-702, MCA. Plaintiffs contend that FWP failed to adequately address and evaluate specific criteria under which projects such as the one at issue are considered.

28

27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

3

5

6 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

2122

23

24 25

26

27 28 It is well settled that judicial review of a FWP determination to issue a permit is governed by \$2-4-702, MCA. There, the Court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case to the agency for further proceedings based on the Court's determinations. The Court may reverse or modify the decision if it finds that substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because: "(a) the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(iii) made upon unlawful procedure;

- (iv) affected by other error of law;
- (v) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record;
- (vi) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. .

Section 2-4-704(2)(a). Petitioner Carver urges the Court to require FWP to prepare an EIS based on the more thorough assessment he contends is necessary. In the meantime, Carver contends the Court is empowered with the authority to reverse the FWP decision to issue the 124 permit.

In Carver's initial brief on judicial review, he sets out the various statutory and administrative rules which govern applications and analysis for streamside permits. Those rules will be discussed below as necessary. Carver contends that based on numerous areas of error, omission or insufficient acted unlawfully as well as arbitrarily FWP capriciously when it issued the 124 permit. Rather than set forth in a laundry list the issues on which Carver relies, the Court will address the meritorious arguments in the following discussion. The dispositive question, of course, is whether the FWP findings and decisions are supported by substantial credible evidence. Section 75-1-201, MCA (emphasis added).

# II. Criteria for Consideration of Application for 124 Permit

FWP's consideration of a 124 permit application is bound by a number of statutory and regulatory provisions. The Stream Protection Act prohibits a state or governmental agency from, inter alia, constructing any project which "may or will obstruct, damage, diminish, destroy, change, modify or vary the natural existing shape and form of any stream or its banks" without first giving notice to FWP with detailed plans and specifications "as soon as preliminary plans are completed but

1
 2
 3

4

5 6

7 8

10

11 12

13 14

15 16

17 18

19

20 21

22

2324

25

2627

28

not less than 60 days" before the project is to begin. Section 87-5-502, MCA. At that point, the department is to examine and investigate the plans and determine whether the project will "adversely affect any fish or game habitat." Sections 87-5-503, 504.

12.8.604, delineates specific elements which the department is to consider when reviewing any fishing access site The administrative regulations require that the development. report on the project include consideration of the impacts of the project on the physical and human environment and whether the project complies with the Montana Environmental Policy Act If FWP, in its evaluation, 12.8.604((1)(b),(c) ARM. determines that the project will significantly affect the human environment, MEPA requires the department to prepare the more extensive review under an EIS. 12.2.430, ARM.

If it appears following review that the proposed project will affect fish or game habitat, the department is to provide plans applicant recommendations or alternate the §87-5-504. ameliorate oreliminate the adverse effect. Statutorily, FWP has 30 days after receiving the proposed plans to advise the applicant whether the construction will adversely affect fish or game habitat; here, Mark Deleray on behalf of FWP acknowledges that his investigation took longer than 30 days with no objection by the County.

In addition to the statutory and regulatory criteria, the Montana Supreme Court has articulated criteria which the agency and the Court must consider in evaluating projects such as this:

An agency must take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of a given project or proposal. Implicit in the requirement that an agency take a hard look at the environmental consequences of its actions is obligation to make an adequate compilation of relevant information, to analyze it reasonably, and to consider [W]hile a court is not to all pertinent data. . . . substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. In other words, the Court looks closely at whether the agency has taken a hard look at the question presented. The Court does not take a hard look itself but requires that the agency does so. The Court focuses on the valicity and appropriateness of

the administrative decision making process without intense scrutiny of the decision itself. In this way, the Court examines the elements of the decision without interfering with the administrative authority over the decision itself.

Clark Fork Coalition v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 2008 MT 407, P 47, 347 Mont. 197, 211, 197 P.3d 482.

In the course of Carver's applications for his subdivision, FWP submitted its comments on the application, contending that the environment of the slough was fragile and needed to be protected. FWP raised concerns over removal of riparian bushes and increased boat use affecting the bank of the slough. initial approvals of Carver's subdivision Following the applications, and as part of the County's abandonment of Wagner Lane, Carver proposed that he set aside a 1-acre lot and deed same to the County in order to replace the prior, non-designated public access. As noted above, the prior access was primitive, with no designated parking. In the course of the discussions to create the public access, Carver appeared at all public hearings as well as any discussions with County officials. Carver urged the County to maintain the primitive nature of access to the water, but he would provide the lot for truck and trailer parking as well as room for turn-around. Instead, in 2009, Flathead County Parks department submitted an application to FWP to build a concrete boat ramp, 5-8 parking spots and a turnaround.

FWP's review of the 124 permit application resulted first in the agency's determination that it only need prepare an environmental assessment (EA), as opposed to an environmental impact statement (EIS). This led to FWP considering the County's application and proposal by way of a checklist analysis.

# III. Specifications of Error

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

## A. Unlawful, Arbitrary or Capricious

There are numerous cases in which the courts have defined unlawful, arbitrary or capricious in judicial review cases. The following discussion describes the analysis applicable to this case:

[T]he standard of review to be applied by the district court and [the reviewing court] is whether the record

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

establishes that the governing body acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully. The governing body's action is unlawful if it fails to comply with the requirements of applicable statutes. The governing body's action is arbitrary and capricious if it came about seemingly at random or by chance, or as an impulsive and unreasonable act of will. In making this determination, the reviewing court must consider whether the governing body's decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.

Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 2011 MT 91, P 65, 360 Mont. 207, 233, 255 P.3d 80 (internal citations omitted).

Also pertinent hereto, Carver urges the Court to consider evidence from his two experts, Roger Noble and Joe Elliott. objects, contending that such evidence was not before it when it The Court notes that the reports from considered the project. Noble and Elliott are in-depth and contain facts and evidence which were available to FWP at all times. Consideration of matters which were not before FWP is, in this case, necessary in order for the Court to determine what FWP should have but did In deciding whether a lower court erred in not consider. holding that the agency acted properly in making its decision, the Montana Supreme Court has stated that the standard of review for an informal agency decision is whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful and that "unless the reviewing court looks beyond the record to determine what matters the agency should have considered, it is impossible for court to determine whether the agency took consideration all relevant factors in reaching its decision." Skyline Sportsmen's Ass'n v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 286 Mont. 108, 113, 951 P.2d 29 (1997) (emphasis added).

Carver raises numerous areas in which he contends the application, the analysis and the process by which FWP conducted its review of the 124 application were deficient and justify either rescission of the permit or preparation of an EIS. Without repeating every area of deficiency, the Court will focus on the most apparent and egregious errors.

### B. Failure to Evaluate Secondary and Cumulative Impacts

ARM 12.2.432(3) sets out in detail the contents of the environmental assessment which an agency must prepare prior to permitting a project. Carver focuses on the requirement that

the agency evaluate cumulative and secondary impacts of the project and consider in a detailed analysis impacts which are significant, potentially which by regulation terrestrial and aquatic life and habitats; water geology; soil quality, stability and moisture; vegetation cover; air quality; and unique, endangered, fragile Cumulative impact is defined as the environmental resources. collective on the environment when considered in impact ARM conjunction with other past and present actions. 12.2.429(7). Secondary impact is defined as further impact to the environment that may be "stimulated or induced by or otherwise result from a direct impact of the action." ARM 12.2.429(18).

10

8

9

17 18

19 20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27 28

Relying on the reports and studies by Roger Noble, senior hydrologist, and Joe Elliott, Ph.D., Carver contends that FWP failed to consider the cumulative and secondary impacts of the following: boat wakes resulting from establishing the concrete boat ramp; impact on air quality not only from high-powered boats but from road dust due to increased use by vehicles towing boat trailers; erosion of bank soil, leading to removal of subsurface plant cover as well as undercutting of the bank vegetation by the increased wave action resulting in increased suspended sediment, as well as loss of property by erosion; invasive water species (which is presently the focus of countywide boat checks); and impact on nesting eagles and other wildlife, including increased human garbage drawing grizzlies and other animals in light of other evidence showing the area to be a corridor of wildlife transportation.

In determining whether or not impacts are significant, the pertinent criteria include the severity, duration, geographic and frequency of occurrence of the impact, probability that the impact will occur, the quantity and quality of each environmental resource or value that would be affected, importance to the state and society value would environmental resource or that be 12.2.431, ARM. FWP determined that the project had minimal environmental impact and, thus, there was no need to prepare an EIS.

Roger Noble submitted his expert report (doc. which he details the specific areas where, in his opinion, FWP failed to adequately address the application. In addition, Mr. Noble points to the various other permits which the County must obtain in order to build the boat ramp and access, i.e., 404 permit, 318 permit and the navigable rivers land use license or easement. Mr. Noble's review of the permit applications and the appropriate agency's findings and determination (or lack thereof) are set forth in his report.

Mr. Mark Deleray, a fisheries biologist with FWP, submitted two affidavits. (Doc. #91 and #111.) In Mr. Deleray's second affidavit, he outlines the steps he took regarding the 124 permit application by Flathead County, which concluded that the project exhibited no significant adverse impact to fish and game habitat. Mr. Deleray asserts that he considered the requirements of 124 permits and conducted an adequate MEPA analysis.

FWP's contention that the Noble and Elliott reports simply reflect disagreement with FWP's conclusions is not entirely Although a checklist environmental assessment provided for in ARM 12.2.432, the above list of secondary and cumulative impacts noted by Noble and Elliott make clear that the analysis should have been more thorough and should have addressed these impacts which were more likely than not to occur as a result of the concrete boat ramp. The Court finds and concludes that the Noble and Elliott reports and affidavits contain "relevant information" and "pertinent data" directly pertain to the determination of the significance of cumulative and secondary impacts from the County project and should have been, but were not, considered by FWP. Clark Fork Coalition, supra. For example, with regard to the impacts of boat wakes, including shore erosion, from larger boats launched via the concrete boat ramp, FWP describes this as "a valid concern," but nevertheless lists the impact as minor, concludes that the impact "cannot be addressed" permitting process, since FWP "has jurisdiction only over construction of the boat ramp." (AR 22.) FWP determined that, if the problem develops, the FWP Commission and Flathead County could restrict boats launching at the site. (AR 22, 26, 28.)

Both Noble and Elliott consider this impact as potentially significant, and opine that it should have been considered as part of a cumulative impacts analysis. Noble points out the susceptibility of the soils in the area to erosion and the Flathead Conservation District's report setting forth a methodology to estimate boat-wake-induced erosion. None of this information or data was referenced in FWP's EA. Noble and Elliott conclude that a traffic study should have been completed as a part of the analysis of the permit application.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The Court will not determine how FWP should have analyzed the potential erosion impacts from boat wakes, but it had a clear mandate to determine "the probability that the impact occur" in determining its significance. 12.2.431(1)(b). There is no determination of probability in the In fact, FWP itself describes its determination in the following equivocal terms: "possible ercsion from boat wakes is a secondary effect that could happen, and may cause erosion." (FWP response, doc. #89, at 11.) It further seems clear that FWP could not have analyzed "the severity, duration, geographic extent, and frequency of occurrence of th[is] impact," ARM 12.2.431(1)(b), if it did not even determine whether the impact was likely to occur. FWP seems to justify its superficial analysis of possible impacts from increased boat use by noting that the area is currently used by boaters who own property on the slough or who enter the slough from the river. this ignores the requirement that cumulative impacts from the project be considered. ARM 12.2.429(7).

Another related issue that was not adequately analyzed by FWP was the impacts on critical wildlife habitat from the likely increased boat usage encouraged by construction of a concrete In the EA, FWP's overriding conclusion was: increases boating use and leads to proposal unacceptable disturbance of fish or wildlife species, boating, fishing, and hunting regulations could be implemented to mitigate impacts." (AR 27.) Therefore, any impacts on fish and wildlife were considered minor and capable of mitigation. FWP acknowledged that boating use levels in the Flathead River had doubled from 2002 to February 2010 but, again, there was no determination of the probability of this impact on an acknowledged fish and wildlife habitat or the cumulative impacts from the project in conjunction with already existing boating uses in the slough.

Indeed, when Carver's subdivision was under consideration, FWP commented: "FWP believes the habitat and public values of Church Slough are extremely significant, rare on a landscape scale, and at risk of being degraded by growth. . . This is . . one of the best birding places in the valley . . . " FWP opined at that time that the County site might not even ever be developed "because of the possible impacts a developed site might have on the water quality, safety, and habitat values of the slough." (Ex. A to Carver affidavit (doc. #73), authored by Mark Deleray and Tom Litchfield, wildlife biologist.)

FWP's subsequent EA lists all such "possible impacts" as minor or non-existent, and gives no explanation for this shift,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

despite its responsibility to provide "a statement of reasons why potential impacts . . , are nonsignificant," "articulate a . . . rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Clark Fork Coalition, supra at P 47-48. In its response brief, FWP arques that these earlier comments are irrelevant to its permit process, and that the Court should subdivision was with consider that the created, unrestricted waterfront lots, that Carver received a permit to modify his shoreline, and that "many boats were launched and operated from [the previous] primitive site . . . " (Response, 19-20.) Given FWP's responsibility to analyze at cumulative effects, it seems crystal clear that these facts should have lead to an enhanced critique of the project's impacts, rather than what appears to be an absolute about-face.

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

FWP's explanation in the EA concerning the "valid concern" from increased boat use that FWP had either non-existent or limited ability to consider the potential impacts from increased boat uses is a mystery to the Court. The suggestion from Carver and his experts is not that FWP, in connection with the permit process, impose a restriction on the size or number of boats On the other hand, FWP clearly has the that can be launched. authority, as it argues in its response brief, to make recommendations or propose alternate plans to the applicant to "eliminate or diminish" any adverse effects to a fish or game Sections 87-5-504, 505, MCA; ARM 12.2.429(2)(a). habitat. FWP had complied with its mandate to actually determine whether or not increased boating use would potentially deteriorate the habitat, there is no reason why it could not recommendations about the project to the County in an effort to The public draft EA states: alleviate the impact. "FWP would approve [the proposed project] with or without modifications to reduce impacts to fish and wildlife habitat. Additional mitigation activities may be identified during the review process and be included in the permit to Flathead County and the Record of Decision." (AR 21.) FWP's after-the-fact insistence that it could not really do anything about the concern of increased boat usage is simply not credible. Its approach, to just permit the project, including the concrete boat ramp, anyway, and then, if deterioration occurs, impose boating, fishing and/or hunting restrictions seems contrary to the entire analytical framework set up in the Stream Protection Act.

FWP's stance in this case is similar to the facts presented in the case of <u>Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana DEQ</u>, <u>supra</u>. In that case, Montana DEQ had permitted the discharge of water into the Clark Ford River from Rock Creek Mine, deeming the discharge

nonsignificant. DEQ declined to consider, independent of the applicant's proposal, that the discharge would not be able to be stopped and that perpetual treatment of the water would be required, long after the mine had closed and the applicant gone from the area. The Montana Supreme Court found DEQ's interpretation of the regulation that it could not independently consider the relevant facts "inconsistent with the spirit of the rule and contrary to the wording" of the statute and the rule. 2008 MT at P 40. In the instant case, FWP's position that it has either non-existent or limited ability to consider the potential impacts from increased boat uses is inconsistent with the content and spirit of the statutes and rules.

As noted above, the department suggests that the Court identify evidence which it may not have considered and which should be considered on remand to the department. It is not the Court's intention to suggest that all the issues identified in the Noble and Elliott affidavits and reports support a finding of "potentially significant." It appears to the Court, as discussed above, that the most significant evidence not adequately considered or addressed by FWP pertains to the potential impacts of an increase in the size and quantity of boats and personal watercraft engendered by the construction of a concrete boat ramp and turn-around. However, clearly FWP should analyze all the evidence presented by Noble and Elliott to determine if it affects the environmental assessment.

#### C. Failure to Consider Reasonable Alternatives

A particularly egregious omission on the part of the County in its application and on the part of FWP in considering the application is both entities' complete failure to consider "a description and analysis of reasonable alternatives...whenever alternatives are reasonably available and prudent to consider." \$75-1-201, MCA; ARM 12.2.432. In its application, the County parks department claimed that its only alternative was "no action" which it claimed might result in lawsuits due to loss of the prior access at the primitive site.

FWP claimed that since the County submitted the proposed action and a "no action" alternative, it was not required nor would it have been appropriate for it to consider any other alternative. Specifically, FWP argues that "it was not prudent to consider an alternative in the EA such as a carry in access, when DFWP received a permit application with a specific design," and that "it was not reasonable for DFWP to impose another alternative on the County." (Response, doc. #89, at 18.)

However, this explanation is entirely inconsistent with FWP's recitation of its responsibilities under the Stream Protection Act:

DFWP may reject the applicant's project design, but if it does, it is obligated to help the applicant improve it. [Section 87-5-504, MCA.] . . . If the department notifies the applicant that such construction will adversely affect any fish or game habitat, it shall accompany such notice with recommendations or alternative plans which will eliminate or diminish such adverse effect. Id.

(Response, doc. #89, at 3.)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

The historical manner in which the prior, primitive access was used is raised in connection with this issue and, actually, has pervaded all aspects of development on Church Slough since Carver first proposed his subdivision. Although as demonstrated in connection with the injunctive proceedings herein, it is difficult to determine exactly what the historic usage was, it clearly was not a designated-access site, and the area was significantly smaller and more limited than a concrete boat ramp, 5-8 parking spots, and a turn-around area.

the County parks department began the Before application, Mr. Carver discussed the access site with parks department staff as well as with the County Attorney's office and the planning office and staff. It is clear that all involved with the development of the County site were aware of Carver's intention to maintain the more primitive and limited access, with the new site providing "substantially the same" (Affidavit of Joe C. Elliott, access as the former site. In fact, at appendix C, portions of Flathead County records.) one point, legal counsel for the County opined that Carver's proposal for a "'drive-to-the-slough-put-in'" would be a "good access." "substantially the provide same solution" and (Flathead County's motion in limine (doc. no. 85), exhibits B and C.) Although it appears there was nothing binding on the County or FWP to accept Carver's proposed alternative, it cannot be said that this proposal was not a reasonably available and prudent alternative. FWP's only explanation for not even addressing this alternative, that it was not prudent to consider because the County submitted a permit a carry-in access application with a specific design was, again, "inconsistent with the spirit of [ARM 12.2.432] and contrary to the wording" of the rule and Section 87-5-504, MCA. Clark Fork Coalition, supra, 2008 MT at P 40. "[W]hen an agency . . . does not exercise its discretion it abuses its discretion," Clark Fork Coalition, supra at P 43, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious decision that cannot be upheld.

## D. Failure to Prepare an EIS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

**10** 

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Although the parties addressed other areas of the application and FWP's cursory review, the Court has determined on the basis of the findings above that the decision to grant the 124 permit did not take into account all relevant evidence and is not supported by an adequate environmental review. The County and FWP must re-analyze the project in light of the additional factual and evidentiary information in the Noble and Elliott reports.

Carver contends that an EIS should have been prepared rather than the cursory EA checklist. FWP responds that it could not prepare an EIS because it had only 30 days in which to advise the County parks department whether the project would impact fish or wildlife habitat. Yet Mark Deleray also reported that his investigation and analysis took longer than 30 days; in fact, it took FWP 5 months to prepare the EA, and 7 months to notify the County of its decision that there was "no adverse effect" of the project.

The Court is unable to determine at this time whether or not an EIS should be prepared. Pursuant to ARM 12.2.431, FWP must first determine the significance of impacts, including the cumulative impacts, employing the criteria discussed above. EIS is required if an impact has a significant adverse effect Therefore, FWP must first properly assess significance of impacts identified by Noble and Elliott. If it finds that any impact is significantly adverse, it must then proceed with an EIS. Given FWP's concerns about this area expressed as far back as 2007, it seems doubtful that a complete analysis of all available information will lead conclusion that the project is "a routine action with limited environmental impact . . . . " ARM 12.2.432(2).

# IV. Conclusion

The decision of FWP fails to comply with the requirements of applicable statutes and regulations; additionally, there are facts and evidence which the applicant and FWP failed to consider but which have now been presented to the Court. Therefore, the matter must be remanded for consideration under the additional evidence and a full review of all reasonable and

prudent alternatives, pursuant to Section 75-1-201(6), MCA. Further, while the Court is not directing FWP to prepare an EIS, it is clear that a more comprehensive analysis must be undertaken, or the permit will be unsupportable. FWP is to take a "hard look" at the project and consider all pertinent data and relevant factors. (...

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of January, 2013.

Katherine R. Curtis District Judge

cc: Ken Kalvig/Angela M. LeDuc, Attorneys at Law Hammer, Hewitt, Jacobs and Quinn, Attorneys at Law Flathead County Attorney William A. Schenk, FWP Legal Counsel

1/4/13 Dunned: smalled but

ORDER AND RATIONALE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 124 PERMIT